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Abstract
Games with incomplete preferences are normal-form games where
the preferences of the players are defined as partial orders over the
outcomes of the game. We define rationality in these games as fol-
lows. A rational player forms a set-valued belief of possible strategies
selected by the opponent(s) and selects a strategy that is not domi-
nated with respect to this belief. Here, we say a strategy is dominated
with respect to the set-valued belief if the player has another strategy
that would yield a better outcome according to the player’s preference
relation, no matter which strategy combination the opponent(s) play
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among those contained in the belief. We define rationalizable strate-
gies as the logical implication of common knowledge of this rational-
ity. We show that the sets of rationalizable strategies are the maximal
mutually nondominated sets, i.e., the maximal sets that contain no
dominated strategies with respect to each other. We show that no
new rationalizable strategies appear when additional preference infor-
mation is included. We consider multicriteria games as a special case
of games with incomplete preferences and introduce a way of repre-
senting incomplete preference information in multicriteria games by
sets of feasible weights of the criteria.
Key— Normal-form games, incomplete preferences, rationalizable
strategies, multicriteria games
1 Introduction
Perea [2014] concludes his review on epistemic game theory by stating that
an important future research topic is to present novel natural collections
of epistemic assumptions and characterize the choices resulting from such
assumptions. In this paper, we take this approach in considering normal-form
games with incomplete preferences as defined by Bade [2005]. In such a game,
two or more players simultaneously select their strategies from fixed sets of
available strategies. The combination of the selected strategies determines
the outcome of the game. The preferences of the players are incomplete, i.e.,
the players are not able to state preferences between all pairs of outcomes.
Bade [2005] showed that the Nash equilibria of this game correspond to the
Nash equilibria of the completions of the game.
The game with incomplete preferences is also a generalization of ordinal
games, where ordinal referes to the idea that there are no numeric values
associated to the outcomes but only a preference order. For a discussion
of ordinal games, see Durieu et al. [2008] and references therein. However,
there preferences were assumed to be complete. In the recent literature,
incomplete preferences have been formulated by Li [2013] [see Xie et al.,
2013, for a generalized definition] as the so-called nonmonetized game. The
nonmonetized game is a similar concept to the game of incomplete preferences
of Bade [2005] except formulated slightly differently. In nonmonetized games,
the incomplete preference order is defined in a common outcome space for all
players while in the game with incomplete preferences, different preference
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orders for each player are defined directly over the strategy combinations.
Bernheim [1984] noted that equilibrium behavior is not a necessary conse-
quence of rationality. Instead, the justifications of Nash equilibrium require
that the players anticipate that the equilibrium solution will be selected. In
the case of no common expectations formed by, e.g., pre-play communication,
common knowledge of rationality and the game does not imply Nash equi-
librium but rather that the players play rationalizable strategies [Bernheim,
1984, Pearce, 1984]. That is, strategies that can be justified with a hierarchy
of beliefs consistent with common knowledge of rationality.
We assume that the incompleteness of the players’ preferences is not only
the perception of an outsider observer but that the players themselves have
incomplete preferences related to the outcomes. Then, if the preferences of
a player do not specify whether he prefers his equilibrium strategy to some
other response to the other players’ equilibrium strategies, the player has
no clear incentive not to deviate from the equilibrium. Thus, the concept
of equilibrium seems even more questionable in games with incomplete pref-
erences and there is a strong motivation to study rationalizable strategies
instead of equilibria.
In the game with incomplete preferences, we argue that one cannot rea-
sonably assume any preferences over lotteries, as even the preferences over
outcomes are not completely specified. Hence, rationality cannot be inter-
preted as the maximization of expected utility. Furthermore, forming a prob-
abilistic belief about the strategies selected by the other players would seem
to necessitate a probabilistic belief about complete preferences of the other
players. If such beliefs exist, the game setting may be analyzed as a Bayesian
game [Harsanyi, 1967] instead of a game with incomplete preferences.
Due to the reasons mentioned above, we apply a more robust concept
of rationality in this paper. Players are not assumed to have probability
distributions over the strategies of the opponents but only set-valued beliefs
of possible strategies of the opponents. The players select nondominated
strategies, i.e., a player does not select a strategy if another strategy yields
a better outcome with all combinations of the strategies of the other players
that he considers possible. Nothing else is assumed about, e.g., the risk
attitudes of the players. Then, we define rationalizability with these set-
valued beliefs.
We characterize the sets of rationalizable strategies in terms of mutual
nondominance as follows. We define mutual nondominance so that sets of
strategies are mutually nondominated if they contain no dominated strategies
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with respect to each other. We show that the sets of rationalizable strategies
are the maximal mutually nondominated sets.
We consider the effect of additional preference information in the follow-
ing sense. All original preferences are maintained and new preferences are
added over some pairs of outcomes for which a player was previously indeci-
sive. These new preferences are assumed to be consistent with the original
preferences, i.e., maintain transitivity and irreflexivity. We show that all
rationalizable strategies of the modified game are rationalizable strategies
of the original game. Therefore, the incompleteness of preference informa-
tion does not cause excluding any strategies that would be contained in the
solutions with more complete preference information. On the other hand,
additional preference information may lead to a more accurate solution in
the sense that some strategies contained in the solution of the original game
are excluded.
In addition to the aforementioned contributions, we consider multicrite-
ria games [Shapley, 1959, Blackwell, 1956, Corley, 1985, Borm et al., 1988,
de Marco and Morgan, 2007] as a special case of games with incomplete
preferences. In the multicriteria games, the preferences are modeled by rep-
resenting the outcomes as pascyoff vectors, where each component of a payoff
vector describes the goodness of the corresponding outcome with respect to
a particular criterion. The main solution concept in the existing literature
on multicriteria games is the multicriteria extension of Nash equilibrium [e.g.
Shapley, 1959, Corley, 1985, Borm et al., 1988, de Marco and Morgan, 2007].
A combination of strategies is an equilibrium if the strategy of each player
is nondominated when other players play the equilibrium strategies. Non-
dominance here means that no other strategy yields a payoff that is at least
as good with respect to all criteria and better with respect to at least one
criterion. This equilibrium concept does not take into account information
about relative importance of criteria. In preference programming [Salo and
Ha¨ma¨la¨inen, 1995], incomplete preference information in the context of mul-
ticriteria decision problems is represented by a set of feasible weights of an
additive value function. The weights represent the relative importance of the
criteria. A decision alternative is preferred to another if it is at least as good
with all the weights in the set of the feasible weights and better with some
weights in the set of the feasible weights. We apply this technique of rep-
resenting incomplete information about preferences to multicriteria games.
While Monroy et al. [2009] considered sets of feasible weights in a bargaining
setting, to our knowledge, sets of feasible weights have not been applied to
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noncooperative multicriteria games. This novel idea enables analyzing the
impact of additional preference information about the relative importance of
the criteria to the solutions of the multicriteria games.
The paper is structured as follows. Games with incomplete preferences
as well as the rationality concept are defined in Section 2, and rationalizable
strategies are defined in Section 3. Section 4 provides properties of the sets
of rationalizable strategies. First, the characterization in terms of mutual
dominance is given in Section 4.1. Then, the relation between rationalizable
strategies and the iterative elimination of dominated strategies is discussed in
Section 4.2. The existence of the rationalizable strategies in the case of finite
strategy sets and possible nonexistence in the infinite case are shown in Sec-
tion 4.3. The result that adding preference information does not lead to ad-
ditional rationalizable strategies is shown in Section 4.4. Multicriteria games
with incomplete preference information are discussed in Section 5. Examples
of a game with incomplete preferences with a finite number of strategies as
well as of a multicriteria game with an infinite number of strategies are given
in Section 6. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section 7.
2 Game with Incomplete Preferences
2.1 Elements of the game
Definition 1. A game with incomplete preferences [Bade, 2005] consists of
the following components:
• The set of players I = {1, . . . , n}.
• For each player i ∈ I, the set of strategies Si.
• For each player i ∈ I, the preference relation: a transitive and irreflex-
ive binary relation i defined on S = S1 × . . .× Sn.
The players are assumed to select their strategies simultaneously. The
combination of the selected strategies then implies the outcome of the game,
and thus the outcome is formally defined as the combination of the se-
lected strategies. Player i ∈ I prefers the outcome implied by strategies
(s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S to the outcome implied by strategies (s′1, . . . , s′n) ∈ S, if
(s1, . . . , sn) i (s′1, . . . , s′n). The preference relations are assumed to be tran-
sitive and irreflexive, but may be incomplete. That is, the players may be
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indecisive over some outcomes or it may not be commonly known which
outcomes the players prefer.
2.2 Rationality Concept
We do not assume that the players possess probabilistic assessments about
what strategies the opponents may select. Instead, we assume only that
a player holds a set-valued belief of possible selections of strategies taken
by the opponents. With no probabilities, the only assumption that can be
made about preferences over strategies is that the rational players do not
select strategies that lead to worse outcomes no matter which strategies the
opponents select among those that are possible according to the belief. Thus,
we take rationality to mean that the players select nondominated strategies
with respect to their beliefs. The set of nondominated strategies for player i
with belief Bi ⊆ S−i is1 hereafter denoted by ND(i, Bi) and defined as
ND(i, Bi) = {si ∈ Si | @s′i ∈ Si : ∀s−i ∈ Bi : (s′i, s−i) i (si, s−i)}. (1)
A useful property of ND is that all strategies nondominated with respect to
a belief remain nondominated if the belief is replaced with another belief
containing additional possible strategies of the opponents. This is formalized
in the following remark.
Remark 1. Let A and B be two beliefs of player i, and A ⊆ B. Then,
ND(i, A) ⊆ ND(i, B).
Our rationality concept formulated in this section can be seen as a re-
laxation of a similar rationality concept based on set-valued beliefs, viz.
rationality∗ defined by Chen et al. [2007]. Here, the difference is that we
allow the preference relation to be incomplete.
3 Definition of Rationalizable Strategies
Bernheim [1984] motivates the concept of rationalizable strategies as the
logical conclusion of assuming that the players view the selections of the
1We use the notational convention that S−i denotes the (n−1)-tuple of sets of strategies
Sk for k 6= i. Expressions such as (si, s−i) are implicitly assumed to refer to the tuple
(s1, . . . , sn) in the correct order.
6
opponents’ strategies as uncertain events, that the players follow Savage’s
axioms of individual rationality, and that the latter as well as the game
(i.e., the strategies and the payoffs) are common knowledge. In this paper,
we assume selection of nondominated strategies in the sense of Section 2.2
instead of Savage rationality. Furthermore, in our case, the game being
common knowledge means that the strategies and the preference relations
are common knowledge. The definition of rationalizable strategies used here
is obtained by modifying the definition in Bernheim [1984] accordingly.
The following notation is taken from Bernheim [1984]. Let ∆iI be the set
of sequences (i1, . . . , im), ij ∈ I for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, where 1 ≤ m < ∞, i1 6= i,
and ij 6= ij+1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Denote the last element of δ ∈ ∆iI by l(δ),
and a sequence formed by adding j to the end of δ by δ + (j). Similarly, a
sequence formed by concatenating δ1 and δ2 is denoted by δ1 + δ2.
Definition 2. A mapping Θ : ∆iI → P (S1) ∪ . . . ∪ P (Sn), where P (Sk)
denotes the power set of Sk, is called a system of beliefs for player i iff
∀δ ∈ ∆iI : Θ(δ) ⊆ Sl(δ).
The interpretation is that for δ = (i1, . . . , im), Θ(δ) is the set of strategies
s for which player i believes that i1 may believe that i2 may believe that
... that im−1 may believe that im may select s. Naturally, such strategies
must belong to the set of strategies of player im, i.e., Θ(δ) is a subset of Sl(δ).
Bernheim [1984] requires Θ(δ) to be a Borel subset. In our nonprobabilistic
framework, no such assumption is necessary and thus the systems of beliefs
are allowed to contain any subsets of the strategy sets Sk.
Common knowledge of rationality implies that i believes that i1 believes
that ... im−1 believes that im is rational. Hence, the strategies that i believes
that i1 believes that ... im−1 believes that im may select must be nondom-
inated with respect to the strategies that i believes that i1 believes that ...
im−1 believes that im believes that his opponents may select. This implies
the following consistency condition for the systems of beliefs.
Definition 3. A system of beliefs of player i, denoted by Θ, is consistent iff
∀δ ∈ ∆iI
Θ(δ) ⊆ ND(l(δ),×j 6=l(δ)Θ(δ + (j)). (2)
Bernheim [1984] requires that each strategy in Θ(δ) is a best response to
some probability distribution over the strategies of l(δ)’s opponents, where
only strategies that i believes that i1 believes that i2 believes that ... that l(δ)
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considers possible may have nonzero probability. Our definition captures the
idea without probability distributions and with nondominance instead of best
responses. Finally, the rationalizable strategies of player i are the strategies
that are nondominated with respect to some consistent system of beliefs for
player i, which leads to the following definition.
Definition 4. Strategy si ∈ Si is rationalizable iff a consistent system of
beliefs Θ of player i exists such that
si ∈ ND(i,×j 6=iΘ((j))). (3)
The set of rationalizable strategies for player i is hereafter denoted by
SRi . The following remark shows that the strategies contained in a consistent
system of beliefs are rationalizable.
Remark 2. Let Θ be a consistent system of beliefs for player i and δ ∈ ∆iI .
Then, Θ(δ) ⊆ SRl(δ).
Proof. If δ′ ∈ ∆l(δ)I , then δ + (l(δ)) + δ′ ∈ ∆iI . Therefore, we may define a
system of beliefs Θ′ for player l(δ) as follows:
Θ′(δ′) = Θ(δ + (l(δ)) + δ′). (4)
Consistency of Θ then implies consistency of Θ′ as well as that the condition
of Eq. 3 is fulfilled for any sj ∈ Θ(δ). Thus, any such sj is rationalizable.
4 Properties of Rationalizable Strategies
In this section, we first characterize the sets of rationalizable strategies as
the largest mutually nondominated sets of players’ strategies. Then, we
show that the iterative elimination of dominated strategies never removes
rationalizable strategies. Furthermore, in the case of finite strategy sets, the
iterative elimination converges exactly to the rationalizable strategies, which
in turn implies the existence of rationalizable strategies in the finite case.
These results are close in spirit to those of Chen et al. [2007] who showed
that their iterative elimination concept, IESDS∗, converges to the largest
stable set with respect to dominance, which in turn is the implication of
common knowledge of rationality∗ as defined in their paper. We give inde-
pendently developed proofs of our results since our rationality concept differs
from rationality∗ in that we allow the preferences to be incomplete.
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Note that while IESDS∗ uses uncountably infinite number of iterations,
we focus only on countable iteration, since our main motivation for studying
the iterative elimination is to show the existence of rationalizable strategies
in the finite case, and to use it as a practical algorithm for actually finding
the rationalizable strategies in games.
In Section 4.4, we formulate and prove the result that adding preference
information to the preference relations does not lead to new rationalizable
strategies. This result is novel and has no correspondence in the rationality∗
framework of Chen et al. [2007] since they do not consider incomplete pref-
erences.
4.1 Characterization
The sets of rationalizable strategies are characterized here in terms of mu-
tually nondominated subsets. We define mutually nondominated subsets as
subsets consisting of strategies that are nondominated with respect to be-
lief that the opponents select from the same mutually nondominated sets.
This concept is an adaptation of the best response property used by Bern-
heim [1984] to the rationality concept used in this paper. In the following,
we show 1) that the sets of rationalizable strategies must be mutually non-
dominated, 2) that any mutually nondominated sets are subsets of the ra-
tionalizable strategies, and 3) that the union of all mutually nondominated
sets is mutually nondominated. This implies that the set of rationalizable
strategies is the union of all mutually nondominated sets. In other words,
the rationalizable strategies comprise the maximal mutually nondominated
set.
Definition 5. An n-tuple of sets of strategies for each player (S ′1, . . . , S
′
n) is
mutually nondominated, denoted by (S ′1, . . . , S
′
n) ∈ MND, if
∀i ∈ I : S ′i ⊆ ND(i, S ′−i). (5)
Lemma 1. The sets of rationalizable strategies are mutually nondominated,
i.e., SR = (SR1 , . . . , S
R
n ) ∈ MND.
Proof. All strategies contained in consistent systems of beliefs must be ra-
tionalizable (Remark 2). On the other hand, a rationalizable strategy must
be nondominated with respect to strategies contained in a consistent system
of beliefs. Therefore, a rationalizable strategy is nondominated with respect
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to a subset of the rationalizable strategies. Based on Remark 1, this implies
that a rationalizable strategy is nondominated with respect to the rational-
izable strategies. Hence, the sets of rationalizable strategies are mutually
nondominated.
Lemma 2. All strategies contained in an n-tuple of mutually nondominated
sets of strategies are rationalizable, i.e.,
∀(S ′1, . . . , S ′n) ∈ MND : S ′1 ⊆ SR1 , . . . , S ′n ⊆ SRn .
Proof. Define the following systems of beliefs for all players: ∀δ ∈ ∆iI : Θ(δ) =
S ′l(δ). Mutual nondominance implies consistency of Θ and that Θ rationalizes
all strategies in (S ′1, . . . , S
′
n).
Definition 6. We denote by
⋃
MND the ordered n-tuple
(
⋃
MND1,
⋃
MND2, . . . ,
⋃
MNDn) such that for all i ∈ I,⋃
MNDi =
⋃{S ′i | ∃S ′ = (S ′1, . . . , S ′n) ∈ MND}. Note that this is an abuse of
notation since
⋃
MND is not technically the union of MND but the tuple of
the unions of the components of the members of MND.
Lemma 3.
⋃
MND ∈ MND.
Proof. For any strategy si in
⋃
MND, there exists a S ′ ∈ MND such that
si ∈ S ′i. By the definition of MND, this implies
si ∈ ND(i, S ′−i). (6)
Furthermore, ND has the property that all nondominated strategies remain
nondominated if the belief set is replaced with its superset. Therefore,
si ∈ ND(i,
⋃
MND−i), (7)
and thus
⋃
MND satisfies Definition 5.
Theorem 1. SR =
⋃
MND.
Proof. Lemma 3 states that
⋃
MND ∈ MND. Hence, Lemma 2 implies that⋃
MND ⊆ SR. On the other hand, Lemma 1 states that SR ∈ MND. Hence,
SR ⊆ ⋃MND. Therefore, SR = ⋃MND.
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4.2 Iterative elimination of dominated strategies
Next, we show that the iterative elimination of dominated strategies never
removes rationalizable strategies. If the strategy sets are finite, the iterative
elimination of dominated strategies converges to the rationalizable strategies.
However, in the case of infinite strategy sets, nonrationalizable strategies may
survive the iterative elimination.
Definition 7. We define the sets of strategies surviving k steps of the itera-
tive elimination recursively as follows. ∀i ∈ I : S0i = Si and
∀i ∈ I, k ∈ N : Sk+1i = ND(i, Sk−i). (8)
Note that clearly ∀i, k : Sk+1i ⊆ Ski . Then, the strategies surviving the itera-
tive elimination of dominated strategies are
∀i : S∞i =
⋂
k∈N
Ski . (9)
Theorem 2. All rationalizable strategies survive the iterative elimination of
dominated strategies, i.e., SRi ⊆ S∞i .
Proof. We show by induction that the set of rationalizable strategies of player
i is a subset of the strategies surviving k steps of the iterative elimination for
all k. Initially, S0i = Si and thus S
0
i ⊆ SRi . Assume that ∀i ∈ I : SRi ⊆ Ski .
The sets of rationalizable strategies are mutually nondominated and thus
also nondominated with respect to Sk−i. Hence ∀i ∈ I : SRi ⊆ Sk+1i .
Theorem 3. If the strategy sets Si are finite, ∃K : k > K ⇒ ∀i Ski = SRi .
Proof. The strategy sets Si are finite and thus strategies can be removed from
them for only a finite number of times. Therefore, ∃K : ∀k > K : ∀i Ski =
Sk+1i . Assume k > K. Then, because ∀i Ski = Sk+1i , the sets Ski are mutually
nondominated, and therefore by Lemma 2, ∀i Ski ⊆ SRi . On the other hand,
according to Theorem 2, ∀i SRi ⊆ S∞i . Therefore, ∀i,∀k > K : Ski = SRi .
Remark 3. There exists a game with incomplete preferences for which SRi 6=
S∞i .
Proof. Consider the following game with two players where the players pick
numbers from the set of natural numbers extended with a ”small infinity”
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(∞′) and a ”big infinity” (∞). The player who selects the largest number
wins. A player always prefers a win to a tie and a tie to a loss. Furthermore,
between two losing outcomes, the players prefer ones where they select larger
numbers. However, the players have no preference between two winning
outcomes. Formally, the sets of strategies are S1 = S2 = {0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞′,∞}
and the preference relation of player 1, 1, is defined so that (n1, n2) 1
(m1,m2) if and only if
• m1 < m2 and n1 ≥ n2, or
• m1 = m2 and n1 > n2, or
• m1 < m2 and n1 > m1,
where the relations > and < are extended so that ∀k ∈ N : ∞,∞′ > k
and ∞ > ∞′. The iterative elimination removes at each step the smallest
number from the remaining strategy sets of both players, and thus
∀k ∈ N : Sk1 = Sk2 = {k, k + 1, . . . ,∞′,∞}, (10)
and therefore S∞1 = S
∞
2 = {∞′,∞}. However, these sets are not mutually
nondominated as only∞ is nondominated with respect to the belief that the
opponent selects from {∞′,∞}.
4.3 Existence
Here, we show in Theorem 4 that when the strategy sets are finite, the sets
of rationalizable strategies are nonempty. However, in the case of infinite
strategy sets, the existence of rationalizable strategies is not guaranteed,
which is illustrated in Remark 4.
Theorem 4. If the strategy sets are finite, the sets of rationalizable strategies
are nonempty.
Proof. Theorem 3 implies that the iterative elimination of dominated strate-
gies converges to the set of rationalizable strategies. When the strategy sets
are finite, a step of the iterative elimination of dominated strategies will
never remove all strategies. Hence, the sets of rationalizable strategies are
nonempty.
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Remark 4. When the strategy sets are allowed to be infinite, the sets of
rationalizable strategies may be empty.
Proof. Consider the game discussed in Remark 3 with the strategies ∞ and
∞′ removed. For this game,
∀k : Sk1 = Sk2 = {k, k + 1, . . .}, (11)
and thus S∞1 = S
∞
2 = ∅. Then, by applying Theorem 2 one can conclude
that SR1 = S
R
2 = ∅.
4.4 Effect of additional preference information
Next, we consider the effect of taking into account additional information
about the preferences of the players. That is, how the sets of rationalizable
strategies change when new preference relations ′i are defined such that
(s1, . . . , sn) i (s′1, . . . , s′n) ⇒ (s1, . . . , sn) ′i (s′1, . . . , s′n), where i refers to
the original preference relations. We denote the dependence of the rational-
izable strategies and mutually nondominated sets on the preference relations
by SR(1, . . . ,n), MND(1, . . . ,n).
Theorem 5. Assume that  and ′ are two preference relations for the
players such that ∀i ∈ I,∀s, s′ ∈ S : s i s′ → s ′i s′. Then, SR(′1, . . . ,′n
) ⊆ SR(1, . . . ,n).
Proof. According to Lemma 1, SR(′1, . . . ,′n) ⊆ MND(′1, . . . ,′n), i.e.,
∀i ∈ I :∀si ∈ SRi (′1, . . . ,′n) : @s′i ∈ Si :
∀s−i ∈ SR−i(′1, . . . ,′n) : (s′i, s−i) ′i (si, s−i). (12)
Then, the assumption s i s′ → s ′i s′ implies that the nonexistence in
Eq. 12 extends to  so that
∀i ∈ I :∀si ∈ SRi (′1, . . . ,′n) : @s′i ∈ Si :
∀s−i ∈ SR−i(′1, . . . ,′n) : (s′i, s−i) i (si, s−i). (13)
Thus, SR(′1, . . . ,′n) ∈ MND(1, . . . ,n). Lemma 2 then implies SR(′1
, . . . ,′n) ⊆ SR(1, . . . ,n).
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The above result can be interpreted as follows. The new preference re-
lations ′ are more accurate than . Here, more accurate is understood to
mean that while all preference statements composing the original incomplete
preference information are correct, the more accurate information contains
additional preferences between outcomes that were incomparable according
to the original information. Theorem 5 then shows that incomplete pref-
erence information will not cause the exclusion of strategies that might be
selected with more accurate information about the preferences. On the other
hand, more accurate preference information may lead to ruling out more
strategies.
However, there may exist rationalizable strategies that are always ruled
out when enough additional preference information is added, no matter which
additional preference information is added. This shown in the following re-
mark.
Remark 5. There exists a game with incomplete preferences that has a ra-
tionalizable strategy that is not a rationalizable strategy in any game where
the preference relations are completed, that is, where the partial orders  are
replaced with total orders that are completions of them.
Proof. Consider a game where S1 = {1, 2, 3}, S2 = {1, 2} and the preferences
of player 1 consist of (1, 2) 1 (1, 1) 1 (3, 1), (2, 1) 1 (2, 2) 1 (3, 2),
see Fig. 1. Assume that no preferences are defined for player 2 and thus
SR2 = {1, 2}. All strategies in S1 are nondominated, and thus, SR1 = S1.
Now, let ′1 be an arbitrary completion of 1. Either (3, 1) ′1 (2, 1) or
(2, 1) ′1 (3, 1). First, assume that (3, 1) ′1 (2, 1). Then, (1, 1) ′1 (3, 1) and
(1, 2) ′1 (3, 2). Therefore, strategy 3 of player 1 is dominated by strategy 1
and thus is not rationalizable. On the other hand, if (2, 1) ′1 (3, 1), strategy
3 is dominated by strategy 2. Hence, strategy 3 is not rationalizable with
any completion of the preferences of player 1.
5 Multicriteria Games
Multicriteria games [Shapley, 1959, Blackwell, 1956, Corley, 1985, Borm et al.,
1988, Ghose and Prasad, 1989, Zhao, 1991, de Marco and Morgan, 2007,
Monroy et al., 2009] are games where players evaluate outcomes according to
several criteria and thus the outcomes correspond to vector-valued payoffs.
14
1,1 1,2
2,1 2,2
3,1 3,2
Figure 1: Preferences of player 1 in Remark 5. An arrow from outcome A to
outcome B refers to A 1 B.
If one outcome is better than another with respect to one criterion but worse
with respect to another criterion, a player may not be able to state his/her
preference between these outcomes. Therefore, the following multicriteria
game is naturally a game with incomplete preferences.
Definition 8. A multicriteria game is a game with incomplete preferences
(c.f. Definition 1) destned so that
• For each player i ∈ I, a vector-valued payoff function: f i(s) : S → Rm,
where s = (s1, . . . , sn), is given.s
• The preferences of the players are defined so that s i s′ iff
∃k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : f ik(s) > f ik(s′), (14)
∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : f ik(s) ≥ f ik(s′). (15)
Multicriteria games have been analyzed in the literature mainly from
the point of view of equilibrium strategies [e.g. Shapley, 1959, Corley, 1985,
Borm et al., 1988, de Marco and Morgan, 2007]. Ghose and Prasad [1989]
considered additionally solutions based on so called security strategies, and
Zhao [1991] discussed cooperative solutions. Since the multicriteria games are
a special case of games with incomplete preferences, rationalizable strategies
and the rationality concept elaborated in this paper can be applied to the
multicriteria games as well.
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5.1 Incomplete preference information
In the existing literature [e.g. Corley, 1985, Borm et al., 1988], information
about the relative importance of criteria has been taken into account by
introducing weight vectors so that each component of the payoff vectors is
weighted according to its relative importance. A multicriteria game is then
turned into a scalar game via multiplying the payoff vectors by these weight
vectors. However, defining the weights would require complete information
about the preferences of the players. Monroy et al. [2009] mentioned the pos-
sibility of using incomplete information about the weights, in form of inequal-
ity constraints, to obtain a unique bargaining solution. Preference program-
ming [Salo and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen, 1995] is a similar idea in the multicriteria de-
cision analysis literature. In preference programming, incomplete preference
information of a decision maker is represented by a set of feasible weights.
In this paper, we apply the concept of preference programming into multi-
criteria games as follows. The preferences of player i are described by a set
of feasible weights Wi ⊆ W 0, where W 0 = {w ∈ Rm : wk ≥ 0,
∑
wk = 1}.
Here, the kth component of a weight vector w describes the relative impor-
tance of the kth criterion. The player prefers an outcome to another if it is
better with at least some weight vector in the set of feasible weights and at
least as good with all weights in the set of feasible weights. This leads to the
following game:
Definition 9. A multicriteria game with incomplete preference information
is a game with incomplete preferences (c.f. Definition 1) defined so that for
each player i ∈ I:
• A vector valued payoff function: f i(s) : S → Rm is given.
• The set of feasible weights Wi ⊂ W 0 = {w ∈ Rm : wk ≥ 0,
∑
wk = 1}
is given.
• The preference relation i is defined so that s i s′ iff
∃w ∈ Wi :wT f i(s) > wT f i(s′), (16)
∀w ∈ Wi :wT f i(s) ≥ wT f i(s′). (17)
Note that wT f i is linear in w and thus Wi can be replaced with the set of the
extremal points of Wi in Eqs. (16-17).
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Note that the relation defined by Eqs. (16-17) is irreflexive and transitive
and thus Definition 9 indeed defines a game with incomplete preferences
following Definition 1. Furthermore, the multicriteria game of Definition 8 is
a special case of Definition 9 where the sets of feasible weights are equal to
the set of all possible weights W 0.
In preference programming, additional preference information is treated
by constraining the set of feasible weights, i.e., replacing Wi with W
′
i ⊆ Wi.
A known result [see, e.g. Liesio¨ et al., 2007] is that limiting the set of the
feasible weights tightens the preference relation in the sense of the premise
of Theorem 5 under a certain technical condition shown in Lemma 4 below.
Lemma 4. Assume that a new multicriteria game with incomplete preference
information is formed from an original multicriteria game with incomplete
preference information so that the original weight sets Wi are replaced with
weight sets W ′i so that W
′
i ⊆ Wi and int(Wi) ∪W ′i 6= ∅. Denote by i the
preference relations of the original game and by ′i the preference relations
of the new game. Then, for any pair of outcomes such that player i prefers
(s1, . . . , sn) over (s
′
1, . . . , s
′
n) in the original game, he/she has the same prefer-
ence in the new game. That is, (s1, . . . , sn) i (s′1, . . . , s′n)→ (s1, . . . , sn) ′i
(s′1, . . . , s
′
n).
Then, Theorem 5 can be applied to multicriteria games with incomplete
preference information as follows.
Theorem 6. If a new multicriteria game with incomplete preference infor-
mation is formed from an original multicriteria game with incomplete prefer-
ence information so that the original weight sets Wi are replaced with weight
sets W ′i so that W
′
i ⊆ Wi and int(Wi) ∪W ′i 6= ∅, the sets of rationalizable
strategies of the new game are subsets of the sets of rationalizable strategies
of the original game.
Proof. The result is directly implied by Lemma 4 and Theorem 5.
6 Examples
In this section, we present two examples. The first one is a game with a finite
number of strategies that is solved by the iterative elimination of dominated
strategies. The second example deals with a multicriteria game containing
an infinite number of strategies that is solved by deriving equations for the
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Player 1
1,1 1,2 1,3
2,1 2,2 2,3
3,1 3,2 3,3
Player 2
1,1 1,2 1,3
2,1 2,2 2,3
3,1 3,2 3,3
Figure 2: Preferences in the first example. The graph on the left represents
the preferences of player 1 and the graph on the right the preferences of
player 2, respectively. An arrow from outcome A to outcome B refers to
A  B.
maximal mutually nondominated sets. The effect of adding preference infor-
mation by limiting the set of feasible weights is also illustrated.
6.1 Game with finite strategy sets
Consider a game with two players having strategy sets S1 = S2 = {1, 2, 3}
and the preference relations
• 1: (1, 1) 1 (2, 1) 1 (3, 1), (3, 2) 1 (2, 2) 1 (1, 2),
• 2: (1, 2) 2 (1, 3), (2, 2) 2 (2, 3), (3, 2) 2 (3, 3).
These relations are illustrated in Fig. 2. The strategy sets are finite and
thus the rationalizable strategies can be found by the iterative elimination of
dominated strategies, as shown in Section 4.2. For player 2, strategy 2 yields
a preferred outcome to strategy 3 no matter which strategy player 1 selects.
For player 1, no strategies are dominated. Thus, S11 = {1, 2, 3}, S12 = {1, 2}.
Both remaining strategies of player 2 are nondominated with respect to S11
as player 2 has no preferences defined for the relevant outcomes. For player
1, all strategies are nondominated as the preference order of the outcomes is
reversed when the strategy of player 2 is switched. Thus, as all remaining
strategies of both players are nondominated, the rationalizable strategies
of the game are SR1 = {1, 2, 3} and SR2 = {1, 2}. Note that strategy 2 of
player 1 is not nondominated with respect to any singleton belief among the
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Player 1
1,1 1,2 1,3
2,1 2,2 2,3
3,1 3,2 3,3
Player 2
1,1 1,2 1,3
2,1 2,2 2,3
3,1 3,2 3,3
Figure 3: Preferences in the first example with additional preference infor-
mation. The graph on the left represents the preferences of player 1 and the
graph on the right the preferences of player 2, respectively. An arrow from
outcome A to outcome B refers to A  B.
rationalizable strategies of player 2 since it is dominated by strategy 1 if
player 2 selects strategy 1 and by strategy 3 if player 2 selects strategy 2.
However, strategy 2 of player 1 is rationalized by the belief that player 2 may
select either strategy 1 or strategy 2.
Now, let us incorporate additional preference information to the game.
Define′2 to consist of2 and the additional preferences (1, 1) ′2 (1, 2), (1, 1) ′2
(1, 3), (2, 1) ′2 (2, 2), (2, 1) ′2 (2, 3), (3, 1) ′2 (3, 2), and (3, 1) ′2 (3, 3).
The new preference relations are illustrated in Fig. 3. Now, for player 2,
strategy 2 is dominated by strategy 1 and the only nondominated strategy
is 1. Therefore, SR2 = {1}. When player 2 is known to select strategy 1, the
only nondominated response of player 1 is strategy 1. Thus, the rational-
izable strategies of the new game are SR1 = {1} and SR2 = {1}. Note that
the new rationalizable strategies are subsets of the rationalizable strategies
of the original game, which is implied by Theorem 5.
6.2 Multicriteria game with infinite strategy sets
A bicriteria Cournot game is discussed by Bade [2005] from the point of
view of equilibrium strategies. In this game setting, there are n players
representing firms that select produced quantities simultaneously. Denote
the quantity selected by player i by si. Assume that the market clearing
price is 2 −∑ si and that the unit cost of production is 1. The profit for
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player i is si (1−
∑
k 6=i sk)− s2i . Besides profits, the firms desire to maximize
sales as long as profits are nonnegative. This can be expressed as a bicriteria
game where the strategy sets are ∀i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n} : Si = [0,∞), and the
payoff vectors are
∀i ∈ I : fi(s1, . . . , sn) =
(
si (1−
∑
k 6=i sk)− s2i
min(si, 1−
∑
k 6=i sk)
)
. (18)
6.2.1 Two players
Here, we obtain the rationalizable stategies of the bicriteria Cournot game
with 2 players by deriving the maximal mutually nondominated sets of the
game. We consider the game first as a multicriteria game in the sense of
Definition 8. Then, we consider additional incomplete preference information
in the sense of Definition 9.
If the opponent selects strategy sj, the payoff vector of player i is
fi(si, sj) =
(
si (1− sj)− s2i , min(si, 1− sj)
)
. (19)
For player i, any strategy si > 1 is dominated by si = 1 as the profits will
be less than and the sales at most equal to what is obtained by selecting
si = 1, no matter which strategy the opponent selects. Hence, no strategies
si > 1 belong to any mutually nondominated sets. When player i believes the
opponent may select sj ∈ [0, 1], 1− sj is a nondominated strategy since the
sales criterion is lower with any strategy si < 1− sj and the profit criterion
is lower with any strategy si > 1 − sj. This implies that S ′1 = [0, 1] and
S ′2 = [0, 1] are mutually nondominated. As no strategies si > 1 belong to
any mutually nondominated sets, it has been shown that SR1 = [0, 1] and
SR2 = [0, 1].
Now, let us add preference information in the sense of Definition 9. As-
sume that one unit of profits is known to be at least as valuable as α units of
sales for both firms. Thus, the sets of feasible weights are W1 = W2 = {w ∈
W 0 | w2 ≤ 11+α}, where W 0 = {(w1, w2) | w1, w2 ≥ 0, w1 + w2 = 1}. The
extreme points of these sets are (1, 0) and ( α
1+α
, 1
1+α
). Thus, the payoffs at
the extreme points are
(1, 0)T fi(si, sj) = si (1− sj)− s2i , (20)(
α
1 + α
,
1
1 + α
)T
fi(si, sj) =
α (si (1− sj)− s2i ) + min(si, 1− sj)
1 + α
. (21)
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When sj is fixed, the value of Eq. 20 as a function of si is increasing when
si ∈ [0, 1−sj2 ] and decreasing when si > 1−sj2 . The value of Eq. 21 as a
function of si is increasing when si ∈
[
0,min
(
1+ 1
α
−sj
2
, 1− sj
)]
. Next, we
argue that if the infimum of S ′j is smin and the supremum of S
′
j is smax, the
set of nondominated strategies with respect to S ′j is
ND(i, S ′j) =
[
max
(
0,
1− smax
2
)
, max
(
0,min
(
1 + 1
α
− smin
2
, 1− smin
))]
.
(22)
First, any si < max(0,
1−smax
2
) is dominated by max(0, 1−smax
2
) and any si >
min
(
1+ 1
α
−smin
2
, 1− smin
)
is dominated by max
(
0,min
(
1+ 1
α
−smin
2
, 1− smin
))
.
Thus, any strategy outside the interval is dominated. On the other hand, for
any si in the interval, all s
′
i < si lead to a lower value of Eq. 21 with some
sj ∈ S ′j and all s′i > si result in a lower value of Eq. 20 with some sj ∈ S ′j.
Therefore, the nondominated strategies indeed consist of the interval.
For symmetry reasons, SR1 = S
R
2 and thus it suffices to search for the maxi-
mal symmetric mutually nondominated sets. Eq. 22 implies that the maximal
symmetric mutually nondominated sets are intervals [smin, smax] that satisfy{
smin = max
(
0, 1−smax
2
)
,
smax = min
(
1+ 1
α
−smin
2
, 1− smin
)
,
(23)
whose solution is {
smin = max
(
1
3
− 1
3α
, 0
)
,
smax = min
(
1
3
+ 2
3α
, 1
)
.
(24)
To summarize, with no information about the relative importance of
the criteria, all strategies between [0, 1] are rationalizable. For example,
s1 = 1, s2 = 1 is not an equilibrium [Bade, 2005], but in the absence of
any equilibrium selection mechanism, it is possible that both players select
strategy 1 unaware that also the opponent will select strategy 1. When the
game is considered with the additional preference information that the play-
ers consider one unit of profits at least as valuable as α units of sales, if
α ≤ 1, the rationalizable strategies given by Eq. 24 are SR1 = SR2 = [0, 1],
i.e., the preference information does not change the rationalizable strate-
gies. However, when α > 1, the rationalizable strategies given by Eq. 24 are
SR1 = S
R
2 = [
1
3
− 1
3α
, 1
3
+ 2
3α
]. Increasing the value of the bound α corresponds
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to adding preference information to the game and as we have shown in Sec-
tion 4.4, Theorem 5, no new rationalizable strategies appear. When α→∞,
i.e., profits become more important, the rationalizable strategies approach
SR1 = S
R
2 = {13}, i.e., the equilibrium [Bade, 2005] and the rationalizable
strategies [Bernheim, 1984] of the single-criterion profit-maximizing Cournot
game.
6.2.2 Multiple players
With n > 2, the analysis of the bicriteria Cournot game is similar to the
case with two players. When the opponents are believed to select strategies
from [smin, smax], the total quantity produced by the opponents varies in
[(n − 1) smin, (n − 1) smax]. Hence, the rationalizable strategies are obtained
by solving the equationssmin = max
(
0, 1−(n−1)smax
2
)
,
smax = min
(
1+ 1
α
−(n−1) smin
2
, 1− (n− 1) smin
)
.
(25)
With some values of n and α, these equations have multiple solutions. Since
the rationalizable strategies are the largest mutually nondominated sets, the
solution corresponding to the rationalizable strategies is the one that pro-
duces an interval that contains the intervals produced by possible other so-
lutions. That is, {
smin = 0,
smax = min
(
1+ 1
α
2
, 1
)
.
(26)
When α ≤ 1, all strategies in [0, 1] are rationalizable as in the two-player
case, wheras with α > 1, the rationalizable strategies are [0,
1+ 1
α
2
]. When
α → ∞, the rationalizable strategies approach the rationalizable strategies
of the single-criterion profit-maximizing Cournot game, i.e., [0, 1
2
] [Bernheim,
1984].
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we considered normal-form games with incomplete preferences
[Bade, 2005]. In terms of epistemic game theory [Perea, 2014], the approach
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of this paper was to consider the implications of common knowledge of ra-
tionality with a relaxed definition such that preferences over outcomes may
be incomplete and the players do not possess probability distributions.
Rationalizable strategies [Bernheim, 1984, Pearce, 1984] have been pro-
posed as an alternative solution concept to Nash equilibrium for situations
where no equilibrium-driving process exists. We revised the concept of ra-
tionalizable strategies so that players are not required to have subjective
probability distributions over the opponents’ strategies nor utility functions
over the outcomes of the game. Instead, the players are assumed only to have
set-valued beliefs and to select nondominated strategies given these beliefs.
In the case of incomplete preferences, we argue that these assumptions are
easier to accept than the framework of expected utility maximization because
information needed to define subjective probabilities and utilities may not
exist.
We showed that no new rationalizable strategies appear in a game with
incomplete preferences when preference information is added in the sense of
adding new preferences over pairs of outcomes into the preference relations.
Another interpretation of this result is that no rationalizable strategies dis-
appear when preferences are relaxed in the sense of removing preferences
over pairs of outcomes from the preference relations. Thus, the game can be
analyzed using only such preference information that one is definitely willing
to assume, with confidence that no strategies are wrongly ruled out.
We considered multicriteria games as a special case of games with in-
complete preferences and introduced a way of adding preference information
to the multicriteria games by modeling incomplete preferences with sets of
feasible weights of the criteria, following the treatment in the literature on
multicriteria decision analysis [e.g. Salo and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen, 1995]. While the
idea of constraining the set of feasible weights has previously been considered
by Monroy et al. [2009] in a multicriteria game, they used it only in a coop-
erative context and assumed that all players have the same feasible weights.
Besides multicriteria games, the game and solution concept developed in this
paper could be applied to, for example, interval games [Levin, 1999], where
payoffs are not known exactly, but only as intervals of possible values.
We showed that the sets of rationalizable strategies as defined in this
paper are nonempty in the case of finite strategy sets. In the infinite case,
nonemptiness is not guaranteed. However, the nonexistence of rationalizable
strategies might be due to unreasonable structure of the preference relations.
A possible topic for future research would be to define intuitively reason-
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able conditions on the preference relations that guarantee the existence of
rationalizable strategies.
We assumed that the players themselves have incomplete preferences and
thus they are allowed to select strategies that would be dominated with any
completion of their preferences. Alternatively, if the incompleteness is only
due to limited information of an external analyst, one could define rationality
so that the players are required to select strategies that are nondominated
with respect to some completion of their preferences.
Recently, Li [2015] generalized the nonmonetized game so that players
may be indifferent between outcomes. The definition of games with incom-
plete preferences could similarly be extended so that the preference relations
allow for indifference. This would necessitate a refinement of our rationality
concept to take weak dominance into account [see Pearce, 1984]. Another
possible extension would be to consider extensive-form games with incom-
plete preferences, which would require introducing appropriate restrictions
on belief updating.
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